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THE NECESSITY FOR CONSTRAINED
DELIBERATION
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

The revitalization of democracy requires some fundamental
structural changes in order to avoid the nightmarish scenarios
that Charles Fried outlined,' scenarios that might in fact, in the
current political climate and constitutional regime, be enacted
into law. Currently, there are serious problems with American
democracy, including low participation in electoral politics and
low voting rates. Indeed, these offer powerful evidence of the
high levels of public cynicism about how this nation conducts
itself in its collective affairs. What does this level of apparent
political malaise reveal?
The answer stems from two very simple facts: first, we
demand too much from our democratic institutions; and
second, we fail to direct and organize political deliberation by
constraining the permissible outcomes that we are able to
achieve through these democratic processes. In other words,
the major structural weakness of American democracy today is
that it has become a pure political majoritarian machine,
unconstrained and unmoored by any discernible constitutional
principle.2 I believe that the only way in which we can
revitalize and improve our level of discourse and deliberation
is to change fundamentally the constitutional ground rules in
which our political institutions operate.
One common prescription for improving democracy dwells
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago. This essay is a revised version of remarks delivered at the Federalist
Society Nineteenth Annual Student Symposium on "Law and the Political
Process" at Harvard Law School, March 3-4, 2000.

1. See Charles Fried, "Revitalizing Democracy": Some Caveats, 24 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 155 (2000).
2. My idea of a government seeks to afford lots of protection for limited

partners. Everybody seems to want to be a general partner-not me. I want to be a
limited partner in a government run with weak general partners, and my right of
non-participation, to some extent, is contingent upon their duty of nonparticipation, or at least limited participation, in the affairs of state.
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on our need for more thoughtful deliberation about the
common good. Yet every time I hear the clarion call for more
deliberative democracy, I put my hand on my wallet. So, in this
moment of disinterested reflection, I ask myself why I assume
this defensive posture. The unfortunate answer is that a
political democracy, as we now have it, contains no substantive
limitations that define the outer boundaries of proper political
deliberation.
Charles Fried talked about the brute fact that today "We the
People" are entitled to regulate, for example, whether you
smoke or whether you carry guns.3 Additionally, it is certainly
commonplace that democracy can now regulate the size of
your hallway leading to your bathroom so as to make sure that
it will be able to accommodate a wheelchair,4 and when you
may visit 5a medical specialist under the so-called Patient's Bill
of Rights.
The last example is especially telling because it illustrates a
basic transformation in political orientation. The real (1791) Bill
of Rights was directed to limit the ability of political
institutions to trench on private rights. The new Bill of Rights
empowers the government to coerce one person to act in ways
that may benefit another. This rhetorical switch allows more
governmental intrusions into what used to be private space
and private transactions.
To avoid this current slippage, we should think less about
democracy and more about republicanism. 6 To make my
meaning clear, I treat republicanism in a narrow, somewhat
formalistic way, by which I mean res publica. A sound
3. See Fried, supra note 1, at 156. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 6-7 (1995) (documenting the upsurge of regulatory
activity beginning in the late 1960s and continuing "unabated to the present").
4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (requiring public accommodations and commercial
facilities to provide ready access for individuals with disabilities.
5. See, e.g., S. 1344,106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2990,106th Cong. (1999).
6. See Richard A. Epstein, The Republican Civic Tradition:Modern RepublicanismOr the Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1634-37 (1988) (describing the
evolution of republicanism) [hereinafter Epstein, Modern Republicanism]; Richard
A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule ofLaw: Civic Virtue and ConstitutionalStructure, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 149, 162-68 (1987) (discussing generally constitutional
republicanism).
7. As I have noted elsewhere, "'republican' is a compound word derived from
the two Latin words, 'res' and 'publica', which loosely translated means 'affairs
pertaining to the public at large.' This linguistic rendition gives a useful clue as to
the proper task of a sound republican political philosophy." Epstein, Modern
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constitution must make sure that public deliberation is directed
towards public matters, just as the Latin suggests. It therefore
becomes incumbent on us to develop a theory whereby public
matters are not expanded insensibly to include whatever topic
the public happens to fancy or worry about at any given time.
The point of departure for this analysis turns on the
instructive concurrence between economics and politics,
namely, in the technical economic definition of public goods:
things that cannot be provided to one unless they are
simultaneously provided to all. No matter how I examine the
problem, I cannot understand how the minimum price charged
for the sale of a quart of milk (which was found to be "affected
with the public interest" in Nebbia v. New Yorko), or the size of
my hallway in my house, or my choice of job, counts as a
public good under any plausible rendition of that definition. By
hewing to that economic definition in politics, we may find a
way, probably the only constitutional way, to sweep the table
clean so that doubters are not able to argue that it is only rank
political bias or opportunism that keeps these matters out of
the political domain.
The second point of concern with democracy is with the
types of outcomes that it produces. In my view, Democracy is
designed to overcome the various collective action 9 and
holdout"° problems that arise in providing public goods. The
good social contract theorist hopes that political deliberations
will yield what are commonly called win-win situations," so
that everybody who participates in democracy comes out
satisfied with what political deliberation has produced. 2
Unfortunately, the odds of achieving win-win outcomes have
been sharply reduced by the rapid decline in the constitutional
Republicanism, supra note 6, at 1648-49.
8. 291 U.S. 502,530 (1934).
9. See RICHARD A. EpsTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 4446 (1998) (describing the
collective action problem).
10. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WrrH THE STATE 36-37 (1993)
(describing the holdout problem).
11. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 122-31 (explaining the "benefit principle" of
modem social contract theory).
12. Additionally, we should be hostile to the situations in which we have winlose contests, which dissipate resources and, in the end, leave everybody worse
off than before. We should try to add whatever judicial filter we can to democratic
institutions in the hope of increasing the odds of nurturing win-win legislation, as
opposed to win-lose legislation.
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protection of economic liberties and private property from state
regulation. So long as these guarantees remain weak and
ineffectual, we lack the necessary formal constraint on the
outcomes of the political process and hence on the
dysfunctional nature of much political deliberation. A uniform
position of judicial restraint opens us up to democratic political13
abuses that are so vast that one has to retreat from them.
Under the current system the astute politician asks: "What is
the minimum political coalition that I have to put together in
order to be able to steal from my fellow man?" After that, it
takes little imagination to dress up the idea with some highsounding rationale that will withstand constitutional scrutiny
under a malnourished rational basis test. The weak protections
for property and economic liberties translate into feeble
incentives for sound legislative behavior. 4 Ironically, this
withdrawal of protection on economic matters has very odd
consequences for the one set of constitutional constraints we
still care about: political speech and communication under the
First Amendment. Yet when property rights are weak, the
robust political market makes it easier to organize corrupt
political coalitions whose object is wealth transfer rather than
overall social improvements. 5 Today, political communication
need not bring everyone inside the charmed circle; rather it
only facilitates communication with political allies. In one
sense, the object is to form the minimum winning coalition
before your rivals can form theirs, knowing the losers will not
have a chance to recoup their losses in the judicial forum.
A previous panel on voting rights spoke at great length
13. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Cartelization of Commerce, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 209, 214-15 (1998) (recognizing that the Justices do a good job achieving
their goal of preserving competition by taking an active role in enforcing the
dormant Commerce Clause).
14. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 116-19 (1992) (describing the decline of
economic liberties).
15. As I have noted elsewhere:
Unregulated political markets tend to work in very different ways from a
free market. It is now possible for some political coalition to block the
voluntary exchange between private parties. Special interest legislation,
on this account, is any form of legislation that tends to take us further
from the competitive solution. With politics, it is far more difficult to
exhaust all the potential gain from trade because there are so many
parties whose interests must be satisfied before agreement is reached.
Epstein, Modern Republicanism, supra note 6, at 1640.
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about the legislative fissures associated with reapportionment

and with various voting requirements. 6 These pressures on
voting rules reveal two serious weaknesses in our current
democratic structure. The first is that it allows politicians to
discuss too many things, so that it distracts them from focusing
on those matters that do require public deliberation. Every
minute that is spent talking about the Family and Medical
Leave Act,'7 for example, is a minute that cannot be spent
speaking about matters of life and death, peace and war, and
national defense, which on any view fall within the political

realm. When we speak about the side issues, we have no
constraints on the types of outcomes that can be conjured up by
fevered legislative majorities who think that it is their duty to
determine, for example, what patients can see which medical
specialists and when.
The revitalization of democracy as a source of popular
respect will come only with a massive redefinition and
shrinkage of its permissible ends. To reach that goal will
require, at a minimum, that many judges (and legislators) who
have treated Lochner v. New Yorl' 8 with suspicion or contempt
rethink their positions to see why its principles could assist in
promoting sound democratic institutions and deliberation.

9

We should try to create a political environment that is receptive
to general social improvements. And if unregulated democracy

16. See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and
Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2000); Richard H. Pildes,
Diffusion ofPoliticalPower and the Voting Rights Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119
(2000); Melissa L. Saunders, The Dirty Little Secrets of Shaw, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 141 (2000).
17. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1994). I have
noted elsewhere why this Act is especially troubling:
As a matter of first principle, I cannot think of any legislation less
meritorious than these laws, no matter the cubby hole in which they are
placed. There is no social justification for disrupting private contractual
arrangements over the question of which circumstances generate leave,
with or without pay, and which do not. It may be good that people are
given leave without pay after the birth of a new child or to take care of a
seriously ill family member .... Yet, no matter how the issue is classified,
there is no reason why any decision over leave should not be made
consensually by the parties instead of coercively by the state.
Richard A. Epstein, ExternalitiesEverywhere? Morals and the PolicePower, 21 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 64 (1997).
18. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (advocating the rethinking of Lochner).
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often strays from that mission, then it ought to be modified and
controlled to the extent that sound constitutional institutions
can do it.
The basic point that must be defended time and time again is
that any political democracy should set a high threshold of
justification before it interferes with the operation of
competitive markets. A sensible form of government directs its
attention to the externalities created by aggression, nuisance, 0
and fraud,2' and seeks to correct any misallocations associated
with monopoly practices.' It then ought to call it a day.

20. See EPSTEIN, supranote 3, at 276-77.
21. See id.at 81-82.
22. See id.at 123-27.
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